

MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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first half of my imagery career, just as knowledge of astronautics would not have helped me in the performance of my duties during the latter half of my career.

Perhaps the biggest blow to the imagery field was the cancellation of the Defense Sensor Interpretation and Applications Training Program in 1997. It was the masters in business administration equivalent for the entire DoD imagery community. It was never replaced and thus left a gap in the 0241 followup training. Reinstating an advanced imagery course to reflect advancements in commercial imagery and multispectral imagery would be more useful in supporting MAGTF operations—much more so than sporting aircrew wings.

Our 0241s can be operationally grounded by sending them to SOI prior to MOS training and then sending them to the appropriate professional military education course commensurate with their rank. That would be much more beneficial than sending them to aircrew school.

**GySgt Edmund M. DeSoto,
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Organizing for the Fight

□ Capt David E. Cooper's article, "An Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency" (MCG, Jun05), graphically highlights the tendency of problem-solvers to focus on process implementation without delving into underlying conflicts caused by the formation of "the civil-military paradox" he notes as crucial for implementation. He succinctly states that in order to increase effectiveness, counterinsurgency commanders need to provide "quick, responsive, dedicated, and directed" strategies that value "unorthodox solutions." He sees a solution to this problem in providing "organic authority" to local commanders to fully integrate "political-civil-military relationships more effectively." Goal formulation and outcome development become

task-driven processes that create "positive synergies" between "civilian-military operational plans" that integrate cultural (Iraqi) norms and sensitivities into mission accomplishment. In summary, he rightly advocates the creation of processes that give local commanders control of multi-agency assets sufficient to provide a winning situation.

My work with public safety services (police/fire) and my experience as a Marine Vietnam veteran have reinforced my belief that "guardian organizations" like the Marine Corps have some difficulty bypassing rules and procedural directives in order to implement the level of quick response that Capt Cooper advocates. I have found that leadership needs to foster critical self-examination in order to become "entrepreneurial" at a level Capt Cooper believes is required to promote mission success.

Leaders in commercial organizations create management structures that are based on meeting internal and external stakeholder needs. This entrepreneurial structure is the intellectual framework of Cooper's suggestions (i.e., meeting theater demands in an efficient and flexible manner). Most commercial managers are adept at reconfiguring their organizations through implementation of various processes. Committees are formed, bottlenecks and difficulties defined, restructuring proposed, and changes enacted and evaluated, with organizational structures reconfigured in response to evaluative data. Unfortunately, it is common that virtually untouched by this process is the examination of tacit, underlying, deeply embedded values that potentially hinder change. Thus, managers and, I would suggest, Marine Corps officers tend to focus on issues that they are comfortable with and avoid critically examining possible organizational value conflicts. Process, by default, therefore, tends to win over unpleasant critical thinking.

In summary, without realizing it Capt Cooper is advocat-

ing the formulation of organizational structures that are dangerously mixed. I believe that when the worlds of guardians and commercials become overly mixed, the result is a dysfunctional organization that is in conflict with itself. Addressing conflicting human values is a tough and complex mental process normally avoided by the average manager. If you are pushing to bring the naturally conflicting world of civilian and military teams together in the chaotic cultural mix that is contemporary Iraq, all leaders should think deeply about how value conflicts must be minimized to ensure mission success. Crucial to this success is the training of local commanders in formulating strategies of counterinsurgency that minimize military-civilian value conflicts.

Thomas A. Lifvendahl

In the Attack

□ I would like to compliment then-CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby for his outstanding article, "Buddy Pairs" (MCG, Jun05). Gunner Eby's concept of buddy team tactics does indeed work. I know because between 1980 and 1989 we taught a form of buddy team tactics that we called "battledrill." I learned battledrill from Capt Jim Snell, the former CO of Co K, 3d Bn, 2d Mar. His research determined that Marines of World War II utilized a form of buddy team tactics. As a Marine Corps doctrinal concept, battledrill (as it pertained to small unit tactics) last appeared in the 1965 edition of the *Fleet Marine Force Manual 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad*.

We considered battledrill to be a universal, unifying concept. We applied battledrill to every tactical situation we faced. The biggest challenge we faced in implementing the battledrill concept was some initial resistance among our squad and platoon leaders as we taught our fire team leaders to exercise more tactical responsibility and freedom. At the point of final assault, we trained our

fire team leaders to seize the initiative and to make instant, aggressive battlefield decisions. Once our Marines had a chance to see the effectiveness of battledrill in practice, every Marine quickly bought into the concept.

The most common criticism we received about battledrill was the expectation that if 27 relatively junior fire team leaders were allowed to make seemingly independent decisions on their own, the battlefield would quickly dissolve into absolute chaos. Battledrill simply acknowledges the fact that at the point of final assault, the battlefield is already in a state of chaos, and the engagement is in the hands of small unit leaders to resolve. What ties the 27 individual fire teams together is the 5-paragraph order, the mission, and the commander's intent—that and practice, practice, practice.

I would like to offer an additional training idea to be used in conjunction with the author's buddy team concept—hand-to-hand field exercises. We would practice our battledrill tactics using the MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) on the live fire and maneuver ranges. However, when those assets were not available, we would use live, refereed hand-to-hand engagements in our field training. Please see my article, "The Warrior Spirit" (MCG, Feb95), for suggested rules, safety considerations, and benefits of live hand-to-hand field exercises.

Carl Kusch

The Cultural Divide

□ LCDR Tamera Swofford's letter re "The Cultural Divide" (MCG, Jul05) contains an important, if implicit, message for those who would reinvent Marines as "Renaissance rangers," and for those who would base foreign adventures on the assumed capabilities of such a force. She relates that she dedicated a year to studying Islam, under expert tutors, "... to learn the cultural considerations of interfacing with ... the approximately 1.5 billion Muslims of the

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